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 This paper presents the challenges of Okinawa and U.S. states affected by 
PFAS from U.S. military bases. States’ experiences suggest changes to Okinawa Living 
Environmental Conservation and EIA regulations based on U.S. compliance obligations, 
described in Executive Order 12088. This analysis recommends that local law link EIA to 
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 Scientists working in American labs produced per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances 
(PFAS) at industrial scale to meet the low reactivity demands of working with Uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6 ) for the 1940’s Manhattan Project. PFAS feature the “strongest bond in 
organic chemistry,”3  resisting degradation in water, oil, or air, CF4 at temperatures below 
1400ºC.4  As a result, PFAS may resist natural degradation for thousands of years.5  
 This persistence enables PFAS to improve a variety of products, from cookware, to 
food packaging, textiles, cosmetics, and firefighting foam. In 2014, DuPont made $95 million 
per day selling PFAS products like Teflon.6  Industry labs, competing for marketshare, have 
produced more than 6,330 kinds of PFAS.7
 That pressure to bring products to market kept firms like DuPont from reporting 
PFAS toxicity. Internal studies showed PFAS harmed animals and workers tested, beginning 
in the 1950’s.8  Firms won approvals for using ninety PFAS in food prep and packaging 
applications, based on limited industry studies.9  Companies chose not to report worker 
illnesses and birth defects, despite 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) obligations.10
 Finally, in 1999, illegally dumping PFAS upstream from a West Virginia farm 
poisoned local wildlife and cows. A judge required DuPont to disclose this hidden history.11 
But DuPont and other producers still guide PFAS regulation, federally and in several 
states.12  
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3  Takashi Okazoe, Overview on the history of organofluorine chemistry from the viewpoint of material industry, 85(8) PROC. 
JPN. ACAD. SER. B PHYS. BIOL. SCI. 276-289 (2009).
4  U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS): INCINERATION 
TO MANAGE PFAS WASTE STREAMS (2020).
5  GRETTA GOLDENMAN (MILIEU LTD), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, STUDY FOR THE STRATEGY FOR A NON-TOXIC 
ENVIRONMENT OF THE 7TH EAP SUB-STUDY D: VERY PERSISTENT CHEMICALS, at 10 (2017).
6  Sharon Lerner, DuPont and the Chemistry of Deception, THE INTERCEPT (2015).
7  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency lists “6330 PFAS CAS-name substances, with 5264 represented 
with a defined chemical structure” but including isotopes and multicomponent chemicals brings the total to 9,252. 
PFAS MASTER LIST OF PFAS SUBSTANCES [sic] (Sept. 16, 2020).
8  Lerner, supra note 6.
9  See Leticia M. Diaz & Margaret R. Stewart, “Forever Chemicals” Forever Altering the Legal Landscape, 7 BELMONT L. 
REV. 308 (2020).
10  See Lerner, supra note 6, Alissa Cordner et al., Guideline levels for PFOA and PFOS in drinking water: the role of 
scientific uncertainty, risk assessment decisions, and social factors, 29 J. OF EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 
157–171 (2019, corrected Feb. 20, 2020), citing Phillippe Grandjean, Delayed discovery, dissemination, and decisions on 
intervention in environmental health: a case study on immunotoxicity of perfluorinated alkylate substances, 17 ENVTL. HEALTH 
62 (2018) and TSCA § 8(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1976).
11  Sharon Lerner, The Case Against DuPont, THE INTERCEPT (2015).
12  See Sharon Lerner, How DuPont Slipped Past the EPA, THE INTERCEPT (2015) and Erin E. O’Brien, Reform Needs to 
Happen PFAST: The Importance of Federal Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substance Regulation, 123 W. VA. L. REV. 233 (2020).
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 Over these 80 years, diverse PFAS have entered most Americans’ blood, and 
scientists have researched seven PFAS thoroughly enough to set safety standards.13  Despite 
their diversity and ubiquity, the United States and Japan mainly target two.14  Voters now 
pressure U.S. states to regulate PFAS in groups,15  while Germany and nordic nations have 
proposed a phase out of PFAS by 2030.16
 1.1. PFAS & Public Health
 PFAS have caused alarm by accumulating in humans and other animals around 
the world.17  The six best known may cause adults a variety of health problems even at fifty 
part per trillion (ppt) exposures.18  PFAS accumulate when we handle PFAS, drink them in 
water, eat them in food, or breathe them in, and mothers can pass PFAS onto their children.19 
Children face particular risk because exposures can have a larger impact on their small 
bodies, affecting their immune system development and vaccine response.20  
 PFAS applied to soil leach into groundwater, especially common PFAS like PFOA 
and PFOS, and recent substitutes with seven fluorinated carbon or less.21  As a result, PFAS 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
13  Cordner et al., supra note 10, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES, AND ENERGY (EGLE), 
MICHIGAN ADOPTS STRICT PFAS IN DRINKING WATER STANDARDS (2020) (regulating PFNA: 6 ppt, PFOA: 8 ppt, 
PFHxA: 0.4 ppm, PFOS: 16 ppt, PFHxS: 51 ppt, PFBS: 420 ppt, & HFPO-DA [Gen-X]: 370 ppt). The European 
Commission (EC) has proposed less stringent drinking water standards for twenty. EC, POLY- AND PERFLUOROALKYL 
SUBSTANCES (PFAS), at 12 (2020).
14  See Diaz & Stewart, supra note 9 (noting the EPA adopted a 70 ppt life-time health advisory for PFOS and 
PFOA but requires notice before production or import of 300 PFAS under TSCA) and Japan's Ministry of Health, 
Labor, & Welfare, infra note 40, (targeting PFOS and PFOA in drinking water), and an Interagency Order, infra 
note 92, (PFOS and PFOSF production and use).
15  MASSACHUSETTS DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (MASS DEP), PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES 
(PFAS): AN UPDATED SUBGROUP APPROACH TO GROUNDWATER AND DRINKING WATER VALUES, at iv-vi (2019) (addressing 
PFOS, PFOA, PFNA, PFHxS, PFDA, and PFHpA) and at 21 (by common characteristics).
16  Sharon Lerner, European Countries Announce Plan to Phase Out Toxic PFAS Chemicals by 2030, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 
2019).
17  Purbita Saha, Birds Are Living Proof That ‘Forever Chemicals’ Pollute Our Water Supplies, AUDUBON MAGAZINE (2019).
18  Cordner et al., supra note 10, citing C8 SCIENCE PANEL, THE SCIENCE PANEL WEBSITE (2017) .
19  U.S. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY (ATSDR), PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES 
(PFAS) AND YOUR HEALTH: HOW CAN I BE EXPOSED? (2020).
20  Cordner et al., supra note 10, citing Philippe Grandjean et al., Serum vaccine antibody concentrations in children 
exposed to perfluorinated compounds, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 307, 391-7 (2012) and ATSDR, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR 
PERFLUOROALKYLS, at 516-517 (2018) (highlighting these among other concerns).




contaminate “the drinking water of more than 16 million Americans in 33 states.”22  “A 
Danish study found that people with elevated levels of a compound called PFBA were more 
than twice as likely to have a severe form of Covid-19,” so lead researcher Phillipe Grandjean 
suggested people living in PFAS hotspots like these Americans may need more vaccine 
doses.23  It also takes years to shed several other PFAS,24  so consumers tend to accumulate 
higher PFAS concentrations than found in their food and water.25  This article, therefore, 
focuses on drinking water among PFAS sources, aiming to reduce PFAS in Okinawa 
residents’ blood.
 1.2. PFAS in Okinawa
 Years of exposure have elevated PFAS levels in the blood of residents, especially the 
roughly 450,000 in south-central Okinawa reliant on the aquifer under Kadena Air Base.26 
Prefecture officials have detected high concentrations of PFAS just outside that base.27  The 
aquifer under another U.S. base, Marine Corp Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, has elevated 
PFAS levels as well, and feeds sacred springs that nearby farmers have used to irrigate their 
crops for generations, causing severe soil pollution.28  
 The most likely source of PFAS on these bases is aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) 
used to fight fuel fires at crash sites. AFFF formulas have relied on PFOS for decades, as 
well as compounds that degrade into PFOA, or PFHxS.29  Overall, scientists link 57 classes of 
PFAS, about 240 compounds, with AFFF.30 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
22  Cordner et al., supra note 10, citing Hu XC, et al., Detection of poly- and perfluoroalkyl substances (PFASs) in U.S. 
drinking water linked to industrial sites, military fire training areas and wastewater treatment plants, 3 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 
LETT. 344–50 (2016).
23  Sharon Lerner, PFAS Chemicals Associated with Covid-19, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 8, 2020). That article associated 
PFBA with AFFF.
24  ATSDR, supra note 20, at 4 (estimating half-lives in humans for PFOS: 5.4 years, PFOA: 8 years, PFHxS: 8.5 
years, PFBuS: 665 hours, and PFBA: 72 hours).
25  Caroline Simonnet-Laprade et al., Biomagnification of perfluoroalkyl acids (PFAAs) in the food web of an urban river: 
assessment of the trophic transfer of targeted and unknown precursors and implications, 21 ENVTL. SCI.: PROC. & IMPACTS 
1864-1874 (2019).
26  Jon Mitchell, PFAS Contamination from US Military Facilities in Mainland Japan and Okinawa, 18 ASIA PAC. J. 16 
(2020) (citing research showing blood PFAS at ppb levels, two to fitty-three times Japan's average).
27  Id. (downstrearn water and fish had PFAS at ppb levels, well above the 90 ppt national average for fish).
28  Id. (spring reliant farm soils also had PFAS at ppb levels, some at the highest levels detected in Japan).
29  ATSDR, supra note 20, at 553.
30  Cordner et al., supra note 10.
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 The U.S. military has been using AFFF with PFAS since the 1960’s,31  “after a 
blaze tore through the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal in 1967, killing more than 130 sailors 
and nearly destroying the ship.”32  Personnel practiced with AFFF at Kadena Air Base over 
an unlined fire pit into the 1980’s. They later moved this training to an area farther from 
Kadena wells, the source of local drinking water.33  Overall, residents likely get their PFAS 
from water and food sourced near bases.34  
 1.3. PFAS & Equity
 Okinawa residents face an inequitable, “victim pays" system instead of a “polluter 
pays" system with respect to their PFAS burden. Victims in the United States have also 
struggled to secure relief, but they have political, administrative, and legal options. For 
example, New York officials billed base commanders for drinking water system improvements 
made to avoid PFAS from military facilities, and filed administrative claims.35  Like victims 
all over America, residents are suing manufacturers and U.S. military officials for relief in 
court.36  They have not yet succeeded, but Congress has authorized support and a number of 
communities have seen cooperation from U.S. military officials.37  
 In Okinawa, residents bear the burden as personal health costs or as water system 
improvement costs. The Okinawa Prefectural Enterprise Bureau (OPEB) installed granular 
activated carbon (GAC) at its Chatan treatment plant to improve water quality. The OPEB 
found that GAC can also remove PFOS and PFOA. Officials planned to change the GAC 
every 8 years, but need to change the GAC every 4 years, only at this facility, to meet the 
2016 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 70 ppt Lifetime Health Advisory for PFOS 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
31  THE PFAS PROJECT LAB, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAM (AFFF) (2020).
32  Marcus Kloeckner et al., 'Forever chemicals' are hundreds of times over safe levels at Katterbach Kaserne site in Germany, 
Army report says, STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 20, 2020) (citing a U.S. Army report).
33  Mitchell, supra note 26.
34  See Andrew B. Lindstrom et al., Polyfluorinated Compounds: Past, Present, and Future, 45 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 7954–
7961 (2011) (studies project food and work responsible for most PFAS exposure in industrialized nations).
35  Kyle Bagenstose and Jenny Wagner, States, military clash on cleanup of toxic chemicals, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2019.
36  Id. See AQUEOUS FILM-FORMING FOAMS (AFFF) PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION, MDL No. 2873.
37  See Bagenstose & Wagner, supra note 35. See also Cristina Tuser, Clarkson University Researchers & U.S. Air Force Use 
Plasma to Remove PFAS, WATER QUALITY PRODUCTS MAGAZINE, Jan. 20, 2020; Keith Matheny, Air Force to take more 
action at PFAS-tainted marsh, but locals skeptical, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jun. 21, 2020; Malcolm McClendon, Air Force 
taking next steps to address PFAS at former Reese AFB, AFIMSC PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Dec. 3, 2019; Elizabeth Dinan, Air Force 
plant removes PFAS from Pease water, SEACOASTONLINE, July 23, 2019..
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and PFOA.38  
 In 2016, the Chatan plant spent about 170 million yen (~1.6 million USD) to change 
the GAC and OPEB sought compensation from Japan’s Ministry of Defense. In 2019, the 
Ministry of Defense denied liability. Officials denied the link between U.S. military AFFF 
and PFAS detected downstream. They also denied that any Japanese standard requires 
compensation for PFAS.39  While OPEB now uses GAC to comply with Japan’s 2020, 50 ppt 
goals, that “goal” language40  and the lack of tracing studies mean the ministry can continue 
to deny liability.41  
 Further efforts to address PFAS risk in Okinawa will also cost money and time, 
while inaction will increase the burden. As PFAS gain visibility in Okinawa, farmers42  and 
fishing communities43  may lose their traditional livelihoods due to PFAS.44  Even at OPEB’s 
compliant 23 ppt PFOS plus PFOA levels,45  children could suffer health impacts,46  leading 
parents to buy reverse osmosis (RO) water and some schools to operate RO systems.47  These 
costs add up, leading an E.U. estimate to find the high costs of remediation are lower than 
the costs of inaction.48  Yet, officials refuse to remove PFAS or compensate under current law.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
38  沖縄県企業局 [Okinawa Prefectural Enterprise Bureau (OPEB)], 企業局における有機フッ素化合物の検出状況及
び水道水の安全性について [About the detection of organic fluorine compounds and safety of tap water] (Jp.).
39  Q プラス「ＰＦＯＳ汚染 日米合同委員会の闇に」(QAB television broadcast Oct. 22, 2019) .
40  「薬 生 水 発  0330 第 １ 号 令 和 2 年 3 月 3 0 日 [Ministry of Health, Labor, & Welfare Notice 0330 No. 1, Mar. 
30, 2020] (setting an interim 50 ppt combined, PFOS plus PFOA drinking water quality management goal).
41  But see Sharon Lerner, U.S. Military Responsible for Widespread PFAS Pollution in Japan, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 7, 
2020) (Jon Mitchell said, “the Japanese government is paying”). According to officials, OPEB is paying.
42  Sharon Anglin Treat, With a second farm shuttered due to massive PFAS contamination, Maine legislators weigh easing 
access to the courts, IATP (2020).
43  “Decatur once had the greatest diversity of freshwater mussels of any place in the world. … ‘Now, the river is a 
dead zone.’” Sharon Lerner, The Battle for Decatur, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 23, 2020) (describing the loss of the mussel 
fishery). See U.S. EPA, STATE PFOS FISH TISSUE ADVISORY VALUES, COMPILED JUNE 2020. 
44  The European Food Safety Authority reviewed research on PFAS and vaccine efficacy, and set 4.4 ng/kg body 
weight/week [4.4 ppt] as a safe level for the sum of PFNA, PFHxS, PFOA, and PFOS in food, far below that found 
in Hija River fish. Britt E. Erickson, EU agency sets limit on PFAS in food, C&EN (Sept. 17, 2020). Mitchell, supra note 
27.
45  沖縄県企業局 PFOS ＋ PFOA 検出状況 [OPEB, PFOS+PFOA Data] (Jp.) reports mean: 23, max: 43, and min: 8 
ppt from 51 samples, Apr. 2019 - Mar. 2020, with the max value reported in November. Data from Apr.-Oct. 2020 
report mean: 13, max: 21, and min: 8 ppt from 30 samples. Past years data report a wide range.
46  See Cordner et al., supra note 20, and ATSDR, MINIMAL RISK LEVELS (MRLS) AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIA 
EVALUATION GUIDES (EMEGS) FOR PFAS (Nov. 2018) (listing lower MRLs for children at 21 ppt (PFOA, PFNA) and 
14 ppt (PFOS)).
47  The U.S. EPA finds GAC and RO can similarly remove PFAS (up to >98 and >99% respectively), so adding 
RO treatment may help. See U.S. EPA, Perfluorooctane Sulfonate [PFOS], Perfluorooctanoic Acid [PFOA], and Per- and 
Polyfluoroalkyl Substances [Other PFAS], in DRINKING WATER TREATABILITY DATABASE (Last updated March 30, 2020).
48  ELEMENTS OF AN E.U. STRATEGY FOR PFASS, at 7 (Dec. 19, 2019).
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 1.4. PFAS & Rule of Law
 For decades unelected officials have decided issues like these in Okinawa, because 
two legal paradigms apply: peacetime rule of law and wartime occupation. A rule of law 
system has “measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation 
of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, 
and procedural and legal transparency."49  This is what U.S. General McArthur promised 
Japan in 1945, and what its 1946 constitution guarantees, except, combined with bilateral 
agreements, it has so far denied local jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.50  
 The U.S. Constitution provides that legislatures and courts decide what the law is, 
holding federal officials accountable to the voting public.51  In an 1812 case, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court looked at how nations treat visiting foreign state ships, finding an implied 
waiver of local jurisdiction.52  Scholars debate whether the law of nations really exempts 
visiting forces from local law.53  The court itself has called this reading into doubt in a recent 
opinion, imposing liability on a foreign sovereign according to a U.S. statute,54 despite its rule 
to interpret legislation in line with the law of nations.55  These cases suggest U.S. immunity 
from courts in Japan comes from agreements, not treaties or the law of nations.
 In line with this concern, both countries receive consistent criticism from experts and 
public surveys for their weak rule of law constraints on government power, Japan for lacking 
legislative and judicial checks.56  Okinawa’s lack of authority over U.S. bases is emblematic. 
Since 2016, OPEB has requested access to investigate the sources of PFAS leaching from 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
49  UNITED NATIONS, WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW?
50  Hiroshi Honma et al, United States Forces in Japan: A Bilateral Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING 
FORCES 365-388 (2001) (U.S. opposition blocked jurisdiction over U.S. personnel via agreements). That constitution 
may hold bilateral treaties superior to its national law. Japan Const. art. 98.
51  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that courts decide habeas petitions, even for prisoners that the 
U.S. military holds in Cuba, unless Congress declares a crisis that closes courts).
52  Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
53  See Peter Rowe, Historical Developments Influencing the Present Law of Visiting Forces, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF VISITING FORCES (2001) at 12, comparing authorities in Schooner Exchange and Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: 
Immunity from Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26 BRIT. YB. INT’L L. 380-5 (1949).
54  “The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of 
no limitation not imposed by itself.” Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S.Ct. 1601 (2020), quoting Schooner Exchange at 
136.
55  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
56  World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index (2020), at 12-13 (definitions), at 22-24 (ranking), at 92 (Japan continues 
to lag peers in legislative and judicial constraints, auditing, lawful transition of power, as well as transparency, 
participation, and dispute resolution) and at 154 (the United States continues to lag in auditing, sanctioning 
misconduct, lawful transition of power, etc., but excels in transparency and participation).
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Kadena Air Base, to help it meet PFAS standards. But U.S. officials have refused to 
cooperatively investigate the extent of PFAS in the groundwater or grant access.57  The U.S. 
- Japan Joint Committee is giving these requests “due consideration.”58  They do not have to 
cooperate. So residents wait, pay, and their burden grows.
 1.4.1. Wartime Occupation
 The U.S. military originally seized the areas that became these bases during its 1945 
invasion, so the law of wartime occupation applied. The international law of war requires 
occupying forces to “respect” local law “unless prevented,59  to ensure “civil life” continues 
as normal,60  and avoid confiscating property.61  Experts also argue occupiers must manage 
natural resources in public trust for the public’s benefit.62  Read together, “respect” would 
mean “comply,” particularly where failure to comply causes unlawful externalities, such as 
spoiled springs, polluted rivers, contaminated drinking water, and civilians paying to treat 
military waste to protect public health.63  This framework could let the military decide how to 
comply, but civilians could decide what the law is, and complying could prevent the military 
from unlawfully interfering in local life.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
57  沖縄県企業局「嘉手納基地への PFOS 等調査のための立入許可申請について」[OPEB, Application for permission 
to enter Kadena Air Base for investigation of PFOS, etc.] (May 18, 2020) (Jp.). Masami Kawamura, Okinawa’s 
Concern Over PFAS Reaches the U.S. Senate, IPP (May 7, 2019).
58  Japanese gov't prevented from environmental inspections on US bases since FY2014, MAINICHI (Nov. 16, 2017), citing 
United States - Japan Joint Committee, Cooperation Concerning Environmental Matters (2015) at § 3(a).
59  “The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall 
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” Hague Convention of 1907, art. 43, 36 
Stat. 2306 (hereinafter Hague Reg).
60  The Hague Reg’s only official language, French, assigned greater meaning to “public order and safety,” using 
“l'ordre et la vie publics.” Meaning, instead of just policing and protecting civilians from hostilities, respect local law 
to minimize the occupation’s impact on civilian life. Edmund H. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant 
under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393 (1945). A U.S. court relied on this interpretation in deciding 
that the military lacked discretion to change the local tort law under the Hague regulations so the court assumed 
Okinawa tort law was foreign law inherited from pre-occupation Okinawa. Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th 
Cir. 1951).
61  “Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.” Hague Reg, supra note 59, at art. 46.
62  WILLIAM A. WILCOX, JR., THE MODERN MILITARY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, at 144 (2007).
63  But see Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 119-123 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding 
the law of war bans poisoning civilians but allows crop and property damage not “calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering,” and poisoning only triggers liability if that poison was banned in America when U.S. personnel applied 
it in Vietnam). Apparently, Vietnam law was not at issue.
43
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 In wartime, the U.S. military grants itself greater flexibility than the law of war 
supports. The U.S. Dept. of Defense, Law of War Manual provides that occupation personnel 
ensure civilians comply with local law, but need not comply with it themselves, and can 
change local law if they provide public notice.64  In 1945, U.S. soldiers not only destroyed 
infrastructure in Okinawa, but also burned down Henoko village and surrounding forests to 
force people out of hiding. Soldiers killed civilians in the chaos.65  
 The surrender instrument and peace treaty with Japan cemented U.S. wartime 
occupation rules. Japan’s emperor favored, and these instruments granted U.S. control 
over Okinawa Prefecture.66  Their 1952 administrative agreement formed a bilateral Joint 
Committee of military and diplomatic officials who granted the U.S. military discretion over 
Okinawa’s law and administration.67  
 This let the U.S. military force land sales and evacuations at gunpoint to secure 
base land.68  The military frequently committed crimes; drastically under-compensated 
victims; passed a miscegenation law that only punished Okinawa natives; censored, denied 
travel documents, and expelled students and elected officials for appearing communist; used 
legislation to suppress labor organizing against wage discrimination and dismal working 
conditions; and imposed racial segregation.69  Despite protests, this regime continued under 
the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).70  
 In the 1960’s and 70’s, residents rioted and demanded reunification with Japan. 
They hoped for fair wages, civilian rule, and the peace constitution to end the U.S. 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
64  U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL (2016) at 780-785.
65  MASAMICHI INOUE, OKINAWA AND THE U.S. MILITARY: IDENTITY MAKING IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 306-308 (2017).
66  See the Potsdam Declaration, art. 7-8 (July 26, 1945), the Treaty of San Francisco, art. 3 (Sept. 8, 1951), 
and the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals observation that the U.S. military operated the only government 
administering Okinawa as of 1951. Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951). In 1947, Emperor Hirohito 
wrote to U.S. leaders that he favored this arrangement lasting for the next 25-50 years, or more, because it would 
help defend Japan and unify its population. INOUE, supra note 65, at 122.
67  “The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and 
about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.” Security Treaty 
Between Japan and the United States of America, art. 3 (1951). See the Administrative Agreement under Article 
III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, art. 2, 3, 26, (1952), and Honma, supra 
note 50, at 373-74.
68  INOUE, supra note 65, at 123-125.
69  Id. at 119-134, 149-150.
70  See the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and 
the United States of America Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in 
Japan, art. 2, 3, 25, 11 U.S.T. 1652 (1960) [hereinafter SOFA], and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
between Japan and the United States of America, art. 6, 11 U.S.T. 1632 (1960).
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occupation.71  U.S. leaders acquiesced in 1972, but the bases endured. The Joint Committee 
still decides whether and how law applies to U.S. bases and personnel in Okinawa, as it 
does elsewhere in Japan. Even today, Japan’s courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over U.S. 
personnel without U.S. consent.72  
 As this section shows, defeating Japan gave U.S. forces power to operate outside of 
international and national law in Okinawa. That reinforces local base cleanup experience, 
that PFAS cleanup will have to wait for Kadena Air Base to close, in the distant future.73 
So a plan seeking action on PFAS in the near future must sidestep this pattern and find 
sufficient support in the other paradigm.
 1.4.2. Peacetime Rule of Law
 While the occupation paradigm can explain Okinawa residents’ inability to address 
PFAS and many other issues, it begins with a misunderstanding. It is not only up to the 
Joint Committee to decide conditions in Okinawa. Now that Okinawa has an elected local 
government with local autonomy rights, locally elected officials can define what the law 
requires.74  Residents may accelerate Okinawa’s transition from wartime occupation toward 
peacetime rule of law.
 Some local officials already use compliance with the law to address PFAS. For 
example, the OPEB has aimed to meet the U.S. EPA’s 70 ppt Lifetime Health Advisory for 
PFOS and PFOA since 2016, and Japan’s interim 50 ppt water quality targets since April, 
2020.75  Fifteen U.S. states have set PFAS drinking water standards.76  New Jersey has set 
discharge permit limits based on its water quality standards, while Massachusetts requires 
monitoring.77 
 That Okinawa officials have not seized this opportunity also explains Okinawa’s 
PFAS problem. While Japan’s Water Supply Act does not give Okinawa authority to set 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
71  INOUE, supra note 65, at 140-150.
72  U.S. officials may resist local jurisdiction over “offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the 
performance of official duty.” SOFA, art. XVII [17] § 3(a)(ii).
73  See Kunitoshi Sakurai, Environmental Restoration of Former US Military Bases in Okinawa, 11 ASIA PAC. J. 47 (2013).
74  See Japan Const. art. 92-95 and 地方自治法 [Local Autonomy Law], Law No. 67 of 1947 (Last amended by Law 
No. 1222 of 2011) at art. 1-2 (2) and art. 2 (9) (Jp.).
75  Okinawa Prefectural Enterprise Bureau (OPEB), supra note 38.
76  See Cordner et al., supra note 10 (analyzing fifteen state standards), SAFER STATES, PFAS (2020) (finding 
15 states have approved standards and 28 are reviewing standards), and the ASS'N of STATE DRINKING WATER 
ADMINISTRATORS, PER- AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS) (2020) (showing how ten states’ standards are 
more broad or strict than EPA’s 70 ppt advisory for PFOS & PFOA).
77  Karen H. Davis, States Begin to Regulate PFAS in Water Discharges, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (Aug. 5, 2020).
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binding drinking water standards,78  the Water Pollution Control Law empowers the 
prefecture to address PFAS discharges into its groundwater and rivers.79  Okinawa law could 
require more action on PFAS.
 1.4.2.1. U.S. Compliance
 Since 1973, U.S. presidents have ordered U.S. officials managing bases in places 
like Okinawa to comply with local environmental standards.80  But the Joint Committee 
had a different strategy. Twenty days before President Nixon issued the order to meet local 
standards, the Joint Committee formalized a procedure for Government of Japan officials to 
request base access to investigate spills. They chose not to inform Okinawa’s local officials 
and civilians of this option for the next 30 years.81  
 In 1977, U.S. officials proposed that the Joint Committee investigate what Japan 
requires and translate relevant local law to plan for compliance. U.S. Joint Committee 
officials resisted, writing that it would be too expensive. They preferred the occupation 
framework, addressing issues on an ad hoc basis.82  That did not change in 1978, when 
President Carter ordered compliance with the more protective local or U.S. environmental 
standards and procedures broadly enforced on private parties.83  Like DuPont,84  the United 
States committed to comply with law and stringent internal policies, but saving money in the 
short term prevailed.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
78  水道法 [Water Supply Act], Act No. 177 of 1957, art. 4 (Jp.).
79  水質汚濁防止法 [Water Pollution Control Law], Law No. 138 of 1970 (amended 1995), art. 3 (authorizing more 
broad and stringent local standards) (Jp.).
80  “Heads of Federal agencies responsible for the construction and operation of Federal facilities outside the 
United States shall assure that such facilities are operated so as to comply with the environmental pollution 
standards of general applicability in the host country or jurisdictions concerned.” Exec. Order No. 11752 
"Prevention, Control, and Abatement of Environmental Pollution at Federal Facilities," (Dec. 17, 1973), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 34793 (Dec. 19, 1973) at § 3(c).
81  Jun Ui, U.S. Military Bases and Environmental Problems, 1 ASIA PAC. J. 9 (2003), discussing the Memorandum to 
the Joint Committee on Cooperation Concerning Environmental Matters, November 29, 1973.
82  在日米軍への環境法令適用を拒否　米大使館、公文書館の史料で判明 [Documents from the U.S. National 
Archives show U.S. Embassy in Japan refused to apply environmental law to U.S. Forces, Japan], OKINAWA TIMES 
(Oct. 27, 2020) (Jp.). 
83  Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1978). This is still in effect, but see Exec. Order No. 13148, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 24595 (2000) (revoking 12088 §“1-4. Pollution Control Plan,” and instead requiring audits and pollution 
prevention), Exec. Order No. 13423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (2007) (revoking 13148 and requiring environmental 
management systems for energy efficiency; overseas optional), Exec. Order 13693, 80 Fed. Reg. 15871 (2015) 
(revoking 13423 and updating policy), and Exec. Order 13834, 83 FR 23771 (2018) (revoking 13693 and aiming for 
efficiency).
84  Lerner, supra note 6.
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 In 1986, Congress established the Defense Environmental Restoration Program 
(DERP), requiring that U.S. military officials respond to hazardous chemical releases 
as civilian law required, specifically, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, Liability Act (CERCLA).85  Even though PFAS producers were still hiding 
disturbing PFAS research from regulators in the 1980’s, and the Joint Committee continued 
to avoid complying with Carter’s order, the DERP, and Japanese law, the U.S. Air Force 
chose to relocate fire training to an area farther from the local drinking water supply.
 In 1990, Congress ordered the military to identify what requirements apply to U.S. 
bases in foreign countries and budget for compliance.86  Finally, military officials attempted 
what Nixon and Carter had ordered: identifying and translating host nation environmental 
standards and procedures, and planning to comply with the more protective requirements 
in force. The military adopted an Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document 
(OEBGD) and Final Governing Standards (FGSs) like the 1995 Japan Environmental 
Governing Standards (JEGS). Officials update these every 2-4 years to stay current with 
changes in the law.87  This formal role for strict host nation law offers opportunities for local 
governments to require action on PFAS. But there are limits.
 1.4.2.2. U.S. Cleanup
 Congress and more so, the U.S. military, distinguished compliance and cleanup. 
Compliance aims to protect U.S. personnel and their families,88  so the JEGS apply the most 
protective requirements.89  This showed up in local news when a general apologized for a 
large AFFF spill and personnel cleaned up AFFF on base.90  The Marine Corp was trying 
to comply with Japanese law to address a recent PFOS release.91  Japan, as a party to the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, has listed PFOS and PFOSF as 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
85  Defense Environmental Restoration Program, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (1986).
86  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 342, 104 Stat. 1485.
87  See U.S. FORCES JAPAN (USFJ), JAPAN ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNING STANDARDS (JEGS), at i-ii (2018).
88  “In developing the [overseas compliance] policy, the Secretary shall ensure that the policy gives consideration 
to adequately protecting the health and safety of military and civilian personnel assigned to such installations.” 
NDAA 1991, supra note 86, at § 342.
89  “These FGS were developed by comparing and adopting the more protective criteria of the OEBGD, applicable 
Government of Japan (GoJ) national and prefectural environmental laws and regulations, and applicable 
international agreements.” JEGS, supra note 87, at C1.1.2.
90  Matthew M. Burke & Aya Ichihashi, Marine general apologizes for massive firefighting foam leak on Okinawa; Japan 
officials want answers, STARS & STRIPES (April 17, 2020), and Marines remove potentially contaminated soil weeks after 
firefighting foam spill on Okinawa, STARS & STRIPES (April 27, 2020).
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hazardous chemicals since 2010. While Japan’s law prohibits their manufacture, import, 
and use (except in fighting fires), recent interagency regulations clarify the JSDF (and USFJ) 
must cleanup after using AFFF.92  
 Investigation and cleanup requirements, addressing decades of past PFAS releases, 
however, only trigger where pollution may violate a broadly applied U.S. federal standard. 
Military policy directs overseas officials to respond to “substantial impact[s] to human health 
and safety.” They investigate if aware of a “reasonable likelihood” of a “substantial impact.” 
They define “substantial impact” as “[a] level of exposure that is occurring, or is about 
to occur within the next 3 to 5 years, and exceeds a generally established, published, and 
applied federal standard in the United States.”93  Still, in the PFAS context, some military 
components also implement the DERP overseas.
 Recently, the U.S. Army has applied the DERP more broadly than the U.S. Dept. of 
Defense as a whole, perhaps to protect base residents. A recent progress report from the Dept. 
of Defense shows the military is investigating PFAS at 651 military facilities, none outside 
of U.S. territory.94  The U.S. Army, however, is investigating PFAS releases consistent with 
DERP requirements, reporting concerns on a U.S. base in Belgium, in Germany, and on at 
least four U.S. bases in the Republic of Korea.95  President Reagan authorized this discretion 
in ordering compliance with the DERP at priority defense facilities, all within U.S. territory, 
and at others as appropriate.96  Since EPA has yet to list PFAS under CERCLA, Army actions 
inline with CERCLA suggest the officials sought to apply practiced procedures to meet a 
PFAS investigation mandate from Congress.97 
 The U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Air Force, however, distinguish the DERP 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
91  See JEGS, supra note 87, at i (“[t]he JEGS does [sic] not address environmental contamination or abatement 
standards,” covered by “DoD Instruction 4715.08”), at 203 (requiring hazardous substance spill reporting and 
cleanup short of remediation), at 246 (listing PFOS and PFOSF as hazardous), and at 10-11 (limiting releases of 
AFFF but without reference to PFOS). 
92  化学物質の審査及び製造等の規制に関する法律施行令附則第三項の表 PFOS 又はその塩の項に規定する消火器、
消火器用消火薬剤及び泡消火薬剤に関する技術上の基準を定める省令 [Technical Document Clarifying Lawful Use 
of AFFF Under the Act on the Regulation of Manufacture and Evaluation of Chemical Substances] [Interagency 
Order] (2018).
93  DEPT. OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NO. 4715.08: REMEDIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES, at 8, 9, 13 (2018).
94  David Vergun, DOD Releases PFAS Task Force Progress Report, DOD NEWS, Mar. 13, 2020.
95  See U.S. ARMY PFAS FACT SHEET (April 2018) and Marcus Kloeckner et al., supra note 32. Chemical weapon 
concerns have challenged the U.S. Army to investigate pollution carefully since the 1970’s. See Kyle E. McSlarrow, 
The Department of Defense Environmental Cleanup Program: Application of State Standards to Federal Facilities after SARA, 17 
ELR 10120 (1987).
96  Exec. Order 12580, at ¶ 2(d), 52 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 23, 1987).
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from their cleanup policy in other countries.98  Like the Marine Corp, the Air Force has 
investigated recent PFAS spills in Okinawa, but has yet to investigate older spills and map 
contamination under the base.99  Maybe in Okinawa, OPEB treats the drinking water to 23 
ppt, complying with the 70 ppt EPA standard the U.S. Army applied,100  so officials see no 
need to further protect base residents.
 1.4.2.3. U.S. Choice of Law
 Even in the compliance context, the U.S. military chooses its obligations. Where 
President Carter’s order calls for complying with law like a private individual,101  the 
JEGS only recognize “[Government of Japan] laws of general applicability, including those 
specifically delegated to prefectural or local governments for implementation, respecting 
environmental protection and which are generally applied to the Japan Self Defense Force 
(JSDF)” as obligations in Japan.102  If Okinawa residents want protective PFAS standards to 
apply to Kadena Air Base, the standards will need support in national law, and will need to 
apply to the Ministry of Defense and JSDF.
 In another departure from President Carter’s order, the Commander of U.S. Forces, 
Japan, interprets the SOFA to exempt U.S. officials from procedural rules, such as local 
permit requirements.103  Germany gets around this problem by enlisting German authorities 
as permit applicants on U.S. forces’ behalf.104  Similarly, Japan’s Ministry of Defense applied 
for a reclamation permit for the Camp Schwab base expansion near Henoko,105  and serves as 
the liable party in residents' lawsuits over U.S. aircraft noise around U.S. bases.106  Perhaps 
ordinances can require that ministry to apply for Kadena water discharge and PFAS storage 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
97  See H.R.2810 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, § 316, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 
1350 (2017).
98  Compare DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION (DODI) NO. 4715.07 (Aug. 2018), and AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO. 
32-7020, ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM (2020), with DODI NO. 4715.08, supra note 93.
99  Kawamura, supra note 57 (citing USAF & USMC spill investigations).
100  OPEB, supra note 45.
101  Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1978).
102  JEGS, supra note 87, at C1.4.3.2.
103  Id. at C1.6.1. Okinawa officials, per personal correspondence (Dec. 2020), apply local water pollution law to 
JSDF facilities, but negotiate without granting or denying discharge permits. Based on the SOFA, they believe U.S. 
facilities are exempt.
104  Rodney Batstone, Respect for the Law of the Receiving State, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 65-66 
(2001).
105  Ministry submits application for land reclamation for alternative facility at Henoko, RYUKYU SHIMPO (Mar. 23, 2013).
106  See Aya Ichihashi, Okinawans Living Near Kadena Air Base, MCAS Futenma Seek $1.8 Million Over Aircraft Noise, 
STARS & STRIPES  (Dec. 4, 2019).
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permits that require action, inline with Japan’s national law.107
 Permit compliance is not only a challenge in Okinawa. When New Mexico imposed 
PFAS response obligations on a U.S. Air Force base in that state, New Mexico had to sue to 
enforce its requirements. The U.S. Air Force refused to address PFAS in its groundwater 
discharge permit application, and challenged the validity of New Mexico’s PFAS standards. 
The Air Force settled their court battles by agreeing to apply for the permit, and paying a 
portion of the imposed penalty as an administrative fee, but the Air Force refused to admit it 
was a source of PFAS in local groundwater.108  Since Japan’s courts lack jurisdiction over U.S. 
military personnel, local standards could impose permit requirements and fees on Japan’s 
Ministry of Defense instead, but could not enforce such remedies against U.S. personnel. 
Since Japan’s standards are not yet enforceable, further action on PFAS may depend on 
Okinawa setting PFAS permit requirements that are.
 1.4.3. The Enforcement Problem
 The occupation legal framework supports resisting action on PFAS. According to 
Japan's Ministry of Defense, until a binding PFAS standard applies, Okinawa residents 
can expect to pay for PFAS treatment.109  Setting standards that the prefecture can enforce 
against private individuals and Japan’s Self Defense Forces (JSDF) could change the JEGS. 
It may also pressure U.S. officials to cooperate, particularly if Japan’s Ministry of Defense 
applies for permits on U.S. Forces’ behalf.110  But a U.S. Air Force official receiving a request 
to enter and investigate PFAS could still refuse, as has happened over the last four years.111
 Setting standards that bind the JSDF presents its own problems. Like Japan’s noise 
standards, Japan’s PFAS water quality standards are not binding.112  Neither standards 
appear in the JEGS. In the noise context, that means residents can sue for temporary 
compensation, and may obtain an order to comply. But local governments and courts cannot 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
107  See Kiminori HAYASHI, Environmental Regulations on the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Water, Pollution and Soil Pollution 
(Kyoto University, Mil. Envtl. Probs. Res. Working Paper No. 1, 2013) (Jp.).
108  Adam H. Cutler, State PFAS Enforcement Against the Federal Government – Irresistible Force Meets Immovable Object? 
FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (Oct. 30, 2020).
109  QAB, supra note 39 (Jp.).
110  But see JEGS, supra note 87, at C1.6.1. “DoD Components shall assist contractors when they are applying for a 
required permit, license or other form of official approval by providing necessary information only.” Id.
111  Okinawa Prefectural Enterprise Bureau (OPEB), supra note 57. 
112  See Ministry of Health, Labor, & Welfare, supra note 40, and 環水大水発第 2005281 号・2005282 号 [Ministry of 
Environment Notice No. 2005281, 2005282]. 令 和 ２ 年 ５ 月 2 8 日 [May 28,2020]  (setting interim 50 ppt PFOS + 
PFOA monitoring-required water quality parameters for surface and ground water) (Jp.).
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threaten to stop military activities if the SDF refuses to comply with standards, as they 
can to private violators.113  In this context, expanding and improving environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) and monitoring obligations could provide enforceable requirements for both 
countries.
 Japan’s laws already require EIA and monitoring related to U.S. military bases. 
Japan’s PFAS standards require drinking water suppliers to monitor for PFOS and PFOA. 
The OPEB also monitors for PFHxS and detected the highest levels of PFHxS in Dakujaku 
River samples downstream from Kadena Air base.114
 In terms of EIA, Japan’s Ministry of Defense not only applied for reclamation 
permits to expand U.S. Camp Schwab, but also complied with local EIA law in assembling its 
application.115  So expanding EIA law to address permit requirements looks promising. 
 Requiring EIA related to constructing a PFAS treatment facility could fit within 
both national laws’ authorizations, making such a provision eligible for inclusion in the 
JEGS.116  Still, it may also be wise to add a catchall provision to the local EIA law, requiring 
EIA for proposals that breach environmental standards and impact large areas of land (e.g. 
the Hija River watershed) or large populations of people (e.g. over 100,000 people), to align 
that local requirement with the basis for other projects listed in the national law.117  That 
catchall, combined with a permit requirement, could trigger EIA if a permit lapses for failing 
to achieve compliance with environmental standards within a deadline.
 1.4.4. EIA Litigation
 The rule of law and occupation stand in tension in Okinawa, as they have in the 
context of U.S. EIA litigation. A principle benefit to adding EIA to requirements, both to 
address constructing a PFAS treatment facility and for certain standard violations, would be 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
113  Shusuke Murai, Supreme Court overturns ruling to suspend nighttime SDF flights at Atsugi air base, JAPAN TIMES (2016) 
(reviewing a Japan Supreme Court opinion, 2015 (Gyo-Hi) 512, Minshu Vol. 70, No. 8, upholding application of tort 
noise standards to Japan Self Defense Force flights, but rejecting lower courts’ orders restricting flights to ensure 
compliance).
114  Okinawa Prefectural Enterprise Bureau (OPEB), supra note 38.
115  See Weston A. Watts Jr. & Kaori Sunagawa, Environmental Impact Statements as Permit Applications for the Futenma 
Replacement Facility in Japan and the Keystone XL Pipeline in the United States, 2 OKI. INT’L. U. J. ECON. & ENVTL. STUD. 9　
(2012) at 11, and at FN7.
116  JEGS, supra note 87, at C1.4.3.2.
117  Both the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Japan’s EIA Law address proposals with 
significant impacts, but Japan’s focuses on construction and land altering projects. See Weston A. Watts Jr. & Kaori 
Sunagawa, MV-22 Osprey Training and Environmental Impact Assessment in the United States and Okinawa, Japan, 1 OKI. 
INT’L. U. J. ECON. & ENVTL. STUD. 40-43 (2011).
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to mirror U.S. EIA requirements that may direct U.S. activities in Japan. The text of the U.S. 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its regulations require EIA before federal 
action may cause significant impacts, including violation of local environmental standards.118 
But U.S. courts have split, finding the rule of law requires enforcing NEPA when proposals 
impact other countries, or relying on the law of occupation to exempt U.S. military officials 
from meeting NEPA’s requirements in Japan.119
 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied 
precedent to find that NEPA requires an EIA when (1) responsible officials decide a matter 
within U.S. territory that has significant impacts abroad, (2) the U.S. Congress has legislative 
control over the area where activities will cause such impacts, (3) applying NEPA would not 
conflict with foreign law, and (4) no other nation’s sovereignty is impacted.120  That same 
year, responding to a NEPA claim from residents of Japan concerning the decision to deploy 
a carrier to Yokosuka, a trial court in that district distinguished Massey. The judge decided 
that NEPA did not apply to that decision because applying NEPA could affect U.S.-Japan 
relations and, even if it did under Massey, the burden on the Joint Committee arrangement 
would outweigh the benefits of ordering an EIA. 121
 A third case updated Massey’s test to reflect subsequent rulings, finding NEPA did 
not require an EIA for impacts on the high seas. Even though (1) a U.S. agency (MARAD) 
reviewed the decision from U.S. territory and (3) it would not conflict with foreign law, (2) 
Congress lacked legislative control over international waters and (4) precedent provided 
that sovereign-less areas do not automatically receive U.S. law coverage. The court reasoned 
that it could distinguish Massey since only two of its four factors supported applying NEPA 
to international waters.122  Some legal scholars see U.S. judges now resist applying NEPA 
to impacts abroad.123  Others write that judges may apply NEPA to U.S. decisions affecting 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
118  NEPA broadly requires EIA for U.S. officials proposing plans with significant environmental impacts, and, 
where consistent with foreign policy, aims to foster international cooperation in addressing environmental 
problems, for the benefit of current and future generations. See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 and 4332(F).  NEPA 
regulations also support an EIA obligation when a proposal will likely cause a violation of environmental 
standards. See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, UPDATE TO THE REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE 
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (2020) (at §1501.3 
defining criteria to trigger an environmental impact statement (EIS), and retaining the last EIS trigger at (b)(2)(iv), 
when “[e]ffects ... would violate Federal, State, Tribal, or local law protecting the environment”).
119  Stephen Dycus described this as a difference between following what Congress wrote NEPA to require and 
refusing to embarrass foreign officials with disclosures about the impacts of their decisions. STEPHEN DYCUS, 
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996) at 29.
120  Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
121  NEPA Coalition v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
122  Basel Action Network v. Maritime Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71-72, (D.D.C. 2005).
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Okinawa, but if Japan objects, may not order compliance due to the burden on treaty 
relations.124  Overall, NEPA looks unreliable.
 Facing similar uncertainty, President Carter ordered U.S. compliance with 
alternative EIA procedures even where courts may refuse to enforce NEPA.125  Unfortunately, 
these procedures involve gathering information but do not necessarily involve public 
participation in deciding how to change plans or address impacts.126  U.S. Air Force 
regulations refer officials to those non-NEPA procedures when considering the impacts of 
their activities in Okinawa.127  They also exempt decisions to continue past practices that 
complied when initiated.128  These rules enable the Air Force to avoid EIA requirements, 
despite public protests, significant impacts, and Congress’s intent as expressed in NEPA.
 Considering the caselaw and preceding discussion, Okinawa Prefecture could change 
relevant law and require compliance with NEPA. If local law, NEPA, and foreign policy in the 
form of President Carter’s order overlap, but U.S. officials fail to comply, Massey could support 
enforcing NEPA. For example, (1) U.S. Air Force officials in Hawaii or Virginia could face an 
“as applied” challenge to their regulations,129  if they (2) prevent compliance with NEPA and 
local law on bases under exclusive U.S. control in Okinawa, so that enforcing NEPA would 
be (3) in harmony with Japan’s law, and (4) affect its sovereignty less than failing to comply. 
Even the NEPA Coalition ruling could support enforcing NEPA in that context, because 
violating both nations’ laws  would do more damage to the bilateral relationship. Even if 
a U.S. court finds a violation of NEPA and orders compliance, however, residents may see a 
continuation of the occupation paradigm. 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
123  Brian L. Greenert, Note, Not in My Backyard, but in Yours: United States Overseas Environmental Policy in Japan and 
South Korea, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2015).
124  Susan Smith, Trouble in Paradise? US Military Forces Abroad, American Environmental Law, and the Law of 
Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OKINAWAN STUDIES, at 41-46 (2013). 
125  Exec. Order No. 12114, 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1517 (1978).
126  A U.S. environmental review that aimed to comply with President Carter’s order did not include any public 
input. Instead, the Marine Corp consulted with host nation agencies, hired a contractor to write an informative 
report with generous conclusions, and Japan translated a summary local residents could read. U.S. MARINE CORP, 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW FOR BASING MV-22 AIRCRAFT AT MCAS FUTENMA AND OPERATING IN JAPAN (2012).
127  32 CFR § 989.1, referring to §§ 989.37 and 989.38 (1999, as amended in 2001).
128 U.S. Air Force regulations exempt from EIA, “[c]ontinuation or resumption of pre-existing actions, where 
there is no substantial change in existing conditions or existing land uses and where the actions were originally 
evaluated in accordance with applicable law and regulations, and surrounding circumstances have not changed.” 
32 C.F.R. A2.3.7 and § 989.14(b)(2).
129  “We hold that a substantive challenge to an agency decision alleging lack of agency authority may be brought 
within six years of the agency's application of that decision to the specific challenger.” Wind River Mining Corp. v. 
United States, 946 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401). Okinawa residents may also qualify 
as “beyond the seas” under that provision. So it may not be too late to challenge these rules. 
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 The Joint Committee could decide the outcome, as residents saw in Japan’s 
Camp Schwab EIA, and exclude residents from the procedure as they saw in the 
dugong litigation. Japan has advanced this Joint Committee plan opposed by Okinawa 
residents and elected officials.130  A U.S. lawsuit challenged U.S. officials to review 
that plan. It established that U.S. law requires considering impacts on foreign species 
listed for their cultural significance.131  Unfortunately, the U.S. military decided that 
it did not need to consider public input or develop a robust baseline of biological data 
to find Okinawa dugong’s loss would be minor. The courts upheld the lack of public 
participation and this finding because U.S. law is less clear about its obligations 
outside of U.S. territory, and Japan’s EIA reached the same conclusions.132  
 These cases suggest that litigation presents benefits but also risks for both 
sides, and could take years. New Mexico and Okinawa experience with U.S. Air Force 
intransigence, however, suggests litigation must be a credible threat to push the 
military to cooperate with a civilian PFAS response effort.
 1.5. PFAS & Local Autonomy
 Okinawa’s mix of systems causes legal uncertainty and limits local autonomy, 
suggesting ordinances and regulations should clarify what the law requires. In the 
United States, Congress has enacted laws authorizing U.S. military cooperation 
with local officials addressing PFAS, but they do not clearly apply to U.S. facilities in 
Okinawa.133  While ten of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures host U.S. military activities 
or facilities,134  Japan’s National Diet does not yet require investigating, removing, 
and remediating PFAS that already burden these prefectures. This limits what local 
officials can promise and deliver to their concerned constituents in Okinawa. 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
130  Editorial: Supreme Court ruling on Henoko project defies common sense, ASAHI SHINBUN (Mar. 31, 2020).
131  See Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005) and Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F.Supp.2d 
1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
132  See Okinawa dugong (Dugong Dugon) v. Mattis, 330 F.Supp.3d 1167, at 1185-98 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 958 F.3d 
895 (9th Cir. 2020).
133  See S.1790 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, §§ 330-4, 7301-7362, Pub. L. No. 116-92 
(2019) 133 STAT. 1198, at § 331 (authorizing PFAS information sharing with local drinking water managers and 
defining installations using 10 U.S.C. 2801(c), including all facilities under U.S. military jurisdiction, like Kadena 
Air Base). But see § 332 (authorizing financial support to local water managers for PFAS treatment, and referring 
to domestically focused statutes).
134  JEGS, supra note 87, at C1.5.6. (listing “Aomori, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Shizuoka, 
Nagasaki, Yamaguchi, and Okinawa” Prefecture).
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 The preceding analysis suggests local reforms should trigger new decisions 
with new requirements, to push Joint Committee officials toward cooperating on PFAS. 
The dugong case’s outcome suggests local reforms should involve the prefecture in 
proposing a PFAS response plan based on public input, to shape the national response. 
This article next presents ways political pressure can reform local institutions, 
amending regulations, ordinances, and proposing a response plan, so residents can 
address the PFAS affecting them.
2.  Reform Proposals
 This section outlines three components of a PFAS response that better serves 
public health, equity, rule of law, and local autonomy.
 2.1. Political Action: Help Elected Officials Lead a PFAS Response
 Residents should push Okinawa Prefecture to improve local autonomy by 
amending its basic environmental ordinance. Like Takarazuka City’s 1996 ordinance, 
it could empower the local government to initiate plans and investigate the impacts 
of those plans with public involvement.135  European regulators also conduct impact 
assessments before approving PFAS response plans.136 
 This prefecture ordinance could focus on the significance of impacts, like the 
U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In doing so, the prefecture could 
engage with Japan and U.S. military officials publicly as it prepares a PFAS plan. U.S. 
officials could participate, consistent with their regulations.137  They could use that 
participation to defend their decisions from any future litigation under NEPA, but at 
least this path could empower residents to set expectations.
 2.2. Regulation: Set Protective PFAS Expectations
 A protective proposal should present legal and regulatory changes to reduce 
Okinawa’s PFAS burden, while triggering U.S. obligations to cooperate. On the first 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
135  YOSHINOBU KITAMURA, LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (8th Ed. 2018) at 153 (Jp.).
136  EC, supra note 13, discussing regulatory impact assessment at 11, 12, and 17.
137  Note especially recent CEQ regulations, supra note 118, at §1506 (authorizing cooperation with local 
governments in satisfaction of NEPA’s EIA requirement).
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point, the prefecture should propose changes to the Living Environment Conservation 
Ordinance Enforcement Regulations138  related to each exposure route.
 Okinawa could require permits for JSDF and U.S. facilities storing PFAS. 
Compliance could require investigating and removing PFAS in soil hydrologically 
connected to springs and rivers. Permits could also require proper disposal of PFAS 
waste, to avoid PFAS deposition around Okinawa incinerators. U.S. law requires 
the military to properly incinerate PFAS waste.139  Japan only requires adequate 
incineration for PFOS, setting 850ºC as the minimum temperature.140  Soil tests around 
a licensed New York kiln showed it did not destroy AFFF from the military, instead 
depositing ash with 4-2100 ppt PFOA in soil downwind.141  So Okinawa should test and 
set requirements for PFOA and other PFAS as well.
 In terms of water, we recommend setting discharge standards like U.S. states. 
For example, Okinawa could regulate PFAS as a group like Massachusetts or like 
Michigan, but apply effluent limits to permits like New Jersey, require monitoring like 
Massachusetts, and groundwater treatment to meet PFAS water quality standards in 
the Dakujaku, Hija, and local springs, like North Carolina.142 
 2.3. Enforcement: Prepare for Compliance and Resistance
 Local law may need new teeth to make cooperation look better to U.S. officials. 
Local water discharge standards, based on national and local water pollution law, could 
require the Ministry of Defense to apply for permits for JSDF and U.S. bases, enable 
independent monitoring, and construct PFAS treatment facilities. The prefecture could 
amend its EIA ordinance to add that kind of facility to its EIA list, and add a catchall 
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
138  沖 縄 県 生 活 環 境 保 全 条 例 施 行 規 則 [Okinawa Prefecture Living Environment Conservation Ordinance 
Enforcement Regulations].
139  See S.1790 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, §§ 330-4, 7301-7362, Pub. L. No. 116-92 
(2019) 133 STAT. 1198. Earthjustice has sued to enforce this requirement to protect affected U.S. neighbors. Save 
Our County et al. v. U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, 4:20-cv-01267 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020).
140  「ＰＦＯＳ含有廃棄物の処理に関する技術的留意事項」[Ministry of Environment, Proper disposal of PFOS-
hazardous waste] (Mar. 2011).
141  E.A. Crunden, PFAS incineration in New York spurs legislation, loss of federal contracts, WASTE DIVE (2020), referring 
to a Bennington College PFAS Study.
142  NORTH CAROLINA DEPT of ENV. QUALITY (DEQ), DEQ ISSUES NPDES PERMIT TO KEEP PFAS OUT OF CAPE FEAR 
RIVER AND REDUCE DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS (2020).
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provision aimed at addressing failure to comply with standards. Permits could lapse 
if impacted waters fail to meet standards within a deadline, requiring EIA and new 
permit applications. If the parties could not agree on a new plan within a deadline, the 
prefecture could issue a public notice of violation that empowers residents to sue locally 
or using NEPA.
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 (Correction) the Water Pollution Control Law ⇒ the Water Pollution Prevention Act 
 
FN79 
水質汚濁防止法 [Water Pollution Prevention Act] Law No. 138 of 1970 (amended 












Id. at C1.6.1. Okinawa Prefecture officials, per correspondence, review JSDF 
discharge plans, approve them, or require revisions before approving such plans. 
Based on the SOFA, they believe U.S. facilities are exempt. 
